The Economics of Aging by Michael D. Hurd
This PDF is a selection from an out-of-print volume from the National
Bureau of Economic Research
Volume Title: The Economics of Aging
Volume Author/Editor: David A. Wise, editor
Volume Publisher: University of Chicago Press
Volume ISBN: 0-226-90295-1
Volume URL: http://www.nber.org/books/wise89-1
Conference Date: March 19-22, 1987
Publication Date: 1989
Chapter Title: The Poverty of Widows: Future Prospects
Chapter Author: Michael D. Hurd
Chapter URL: http://www.nber.org/chapters/c11583




Although the economic well-being of the elderly has improved sub-
stantially over the past several decades, a high fraction of the elderly,
especially of widows, is still in poverty. One might hope that as today's
elderly population ages further this fraction will decline because the
young elderly come from cohorts with substantially higher lifetime
earnings than the cohorts of the old elderly. The purpose of this paper
is to study the likelihood this will happen. The approach is to examine
a number of the factors that will influence the fraction in poverty and
to forecast how the fraction will change in the future.
One method to forecast the fraction of the elderly in poverty would
be to study trends in income and apply the trends to the incomes of
each age group. This would amount to forecasting the future economic
status of today's young elderly from the economic status of today's
old elderly and from trends in income. But this method is not likely to
be reliable for a number of reasons. First, each cohort has had different
lifetime earnings and rates of return on their savings; therefore, the
current economic status of today's old elderly is probably not a useful
guide to the current or future economic status of today's young elderly.
Second, the elderly have had substantial changes in Social Security
and Medicare/Medicaid whereas both of these programs will probably
be stable in the future. Third, changes in mortality rates will mean that
poverty rates of the young elderly will eventually be higher than a trend
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analysis would indicate. Finally, a trend analysis can only answer a
limited number of questions because it is not based on an economic
model; for example, it cannot say how the poverty rate would change
in response to a change in Social Security because it does not model
how the individuals would respond to such a change.
In this paper I forecast the poverty rates of the elderly by using an
economic model of consumption. The parameters of the model have
been estimated from panel data. The model takes as initial conditions
the resources of retirement-aged couples and individuals. Given those
resources, the model predicts what consumption will be in each future
time period. Thus one can trace out the future path of consumption,
wealth, and income of each individual and couple. This method has a
number of advantages. It is based on observed behavior, and it is
founded on economic theory. Because it forecasts the consumption of
individuals, it provides details on the distribution of consumption, in-
come, and wealth, not just on the means. It can be used to study
changes in poverty rates in response to changes in the environment.
Finally, it can be used to define a consumption-based measure of pov-
erty that, I believe, is more appropriate for the elderly than the usual
income-based measure.
7.2 Forecasting the Economic Status of the Elderly
The future economic status of a cohort of the elderly depends on
initial economic resources, the future economic environment, the choices
the individuals make, and future random events. The problem is sim-
plified considerably if one considers only people who have retired be-
cause their economic resources are known; forecasting the future
economic status of workers is complicated because the resources of
workers depend on future wage growth and labor force participation.
Furthermore, many of the elderly have a rather stable economic en-
vironment because most of their assets (housing, Social Security, and
Medicare/Medicaid) are indexed. Indeed, the elderly apparently were
better protected against the fall in real income during the 1970s than
the rest of the population (Hurd and Shoven 1983).
In this paper I concentrate on forecasting how the economic status
of the elderly changes as a result of their consumption decisions. I take
as initial conditions the distribution of resources, ages, and household
structures in the 1979 Retirement History Survey (RHS). Using a utility-
based model of consumption behavior that I have estimated over ten
years of data from the RHS, I forecast the consumption and wealth
trajectories of each household in the RHS. Each household will, with
a probability that is based on the mortality tables, produce households
of different composition in each future period. Thus the number of203 The Poverty of Widows
households defined by composition and assets grows each time period,
but the weight attached to each type shrinks. From the forecasts, a
future population of the elderly is generated. It is the elderly population
that would be found in a steady-state economy in which each cohort
reaches the age of the 1979 RHS population with the distribution of
assets and household composition of the 1979 RHS. From this standing
population, I study the distribution of assets, consumption, and poverty
status at each age. Of course, an alternative statement is that the fore-
casts are of the 1979 RHS population at each future age.
The advantage of this paper's method is that it distinguishes how
much poverty is due to initial conditions and how much is due to life-
cycle behavior after retirement. It has the further advantage that a
consumption-based measure of economic well-being comes naturally
from the calculations. This is especially important for the elderly be-
cause income, the usual measure, is not a good measure of their eco-
nomic position; life-cycle considerations indicate that at some age they
will consume part of their capital. Although wealth is probably a better
measure of economic position than income, it is not completely sat-
isfactory either because of the importance of Social Security and other
annuities. When they are exogenous it is not obvious how to aggregate
them with bequethable wealth.
The model that is used to forecast consumption and wealth is based
on utility maximization under uncertainty about the date of death. The
utility-maximization problem can be solved for singles but not for cou-
ples because the utility function of couples changes depending on the
future mortality realizations. Although the consumption model is ap-
propriate for studying the future economic status of the 1979 widows
in the RHS, by itself it cannot be used to forecast the poverty status
of widows because the couples will generate new widows as they age;
in order to project the economic status of the new widows, their initial
conditions must be known. My ad hoc solution is to assume that couples
consume their bequeathable wealth at the average rate that was ob-
served over retired couples in the ten years of the RHS. This rate was
0.016 per year.
Because the forecasts depend on the quality of the model and the
parameter estimates, I discuss in the appendix the specification and
estimation of the economic model. (More details can be found in Hurd
1986.) Here I briefly outline the ideas behind the consumption model.
Suppose a retired individual wants to maximize lifetime utility when
the date of death is uncertain. Utility depends on consumption each
time period and on any bequests he might leave should he die. Eco-
nomic resources are initial bequeathable wealth and annuities, which
include Social Security, Medicare/Medicaid, and private pensions. It
can be shown that the solution to this utility-maximization problem204 Michael D. Hurd
implies that desired consumption will depend on the parameters of the
utility function, mortality rates, bequeathable wealth, the entire time
path of annuities, and the strength of the bequest motive. I used the
solution to the utility-maximization problem along with data from the
ten years of the RHS to estimate the parameters of the utility function.
Given the parameters, the economic resources, and the utility-based
model, I can forecast the future consumption and wealth paths of each
individual in the RHS.
7.3 Forecasting Consumption and Wealth
The consumption and wealth of each single person in the 1979 RHS
can be projected given the estimated model and initial conditions by
solving equations (5) of the appendix. The initial conditions are real
annuities, which include Social Security benefits and Medicare/Medicaid,
nominal annuities, which include pensions and bequeathable wealth,
and the path of mortality rates which are defined by age, race, and
sex. There are two types of solutions depending on which of the pa-
rameter estimates are used in the solution. As explained in the appen-
dix, the different sets of parameter estimates come from different
estimation methods. The first type of solution, which I call the nonlinear
least squares (NLLS) solution, is illustrated in figure 7.1. The second
type, which I call the nonlinear two-stage least squares (NL2SLS), is
shown in figure 7.2. The NLLS path of consumption quickly falls so





Fig. 7.1 Consumption and wealth trajectories based on the NLLS
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Fig. 7.2 Consumption paths based on the NL2SLS parameters
The NL2SLS path of consumption is much flatter, and wealth lasts to
a greater age. Regardless of which estimates are used, the wealth and
consumption paths of all the 1979 single people will, when weighted
by the probabilities of living, give the expected distributions of wealth
and consumption not only at each year but also across years.
Table 7.1 shows, for the 1979 RHS widows, the means and medians
of consumption, wealth, and income every two years from 1979 through
1999.' Part A, based on the NLLS estimates, has consumption and
wealth paths like those of figure 7.1. The widows are poor to begin
with and rapidly become poorer. By 1989 median bequeathable wealth
has fallen to zero, so that at least half of the surviving widows will live
from their annuity income only. By 1999 mean bequeathable wealth is
essentially zero; therefore, all observations will have exhausted their
bequeathable wealth.
Regardless of what the definition of poverty is, it is obvious that,
according to these projections, these surviving widows will be poor. It
will be useful, however, to make an estimate of the fraction in poverty
in each year. The U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) defines poverty
according to observed income. For the elderly there are at least two
weaknesses to this definition. First, if the rate of inflation is positive,
using nominal income from capital implies real capital decumulation
because the interest rate that is used to calculate the income is nominal.
Thus, the welfare implications of nominal income are obscured. Sec-
ond, according to the life-cycle hypothesis, income of the elderly is
not a good welfare indicator because some wealth should be consumed
at advanced ages. I use two measures to calculate the fraction below
poverty. The first, an income-based measure, is the sum of annuities
and real income from capital. I use a real rate of 0.03. The second isoofN</->r--vo©©©©©©
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consumption. For singles, consumption is estimated from the utility
model. For couples, consumption is the sum of annuities, real income
from capital, and the change in capital. Because of the ad hoc as-
sumption about the trajectory of the capital stock of couples, the es-
timate of consumption for couples reduces to the sum of annuities and
4.6 percent of capital. I take the poverty levels to be those given by
the BLS: $3,479 for one person over the age of 65, and $4,388 for two
persons over the age of 65, both figures in 1979 dollars.
Any measure of the welfare of the elderly must address the problem
of placing a value on Medicare/Medicaid. The program certainly is of
some value. Were there no such program, the elderly would spend
more of their own wealth on medical care. Rather then speculate about
the value, I present two sets of consumption and income measures.
The first follows Hurd and Shoven (1983). It includes a value roughly
equal to the average transfer through the Medicare/Medicaid system
to each eligible person. The idea is that the transfer is the value of a
fair medical insurance policy which is given each year to those eligible.
The second set of results excludes any valuation for Medicare/Medicaid.
According to the income-based measure of poverty that includes
Medicare/Medicaid, the fraction of 1979 RHS widows in poverty begins
at a high level and rises slowly as wealth is decumulated. It eventually
reaches 38 percent. Because mean wealth is zero, the fraction in pov-
erty will not change further: all the widows that are below the poverty
line will remain in poverty and all above will remain out of poverty.
The consumption-based measure shows the fraction in poverty starting
at a modest level but eventually reaching the same point as the income-
based level. This happens, of course, because when bequeathable wealth
is exhausted, consumption equals annuity income.
If Medicare/Medicaid is excluded, the results change substantially.
The fractions in poverty are much higher at the beginning, and they
reach very high levels. Again, however, there are large differences in
the early years between the consumption-based and income-based
measures.
Part B of table 7.1 gives projections based on the NL2SLS parameter
estimates. Typical consumption paths are shown in figure 7.2. The
consumption paths are much flatter and more wealth is held than the
paths based on the NLLS parameter estimates. This means that initially
the consumption-based measure of poverty will show a higher fraction
in poverty, but at more advanced ages the fraction in poverty will be
smaller. The average fraction in poverty over all age groups is about
the same.
The projections of the 1979 RHS widows do not give any idea of the
economic status of a steady-state population of widows because the
composition only changes by the mortality of the widows. In that209 The Poverty of Widows
couples are substantially more wealthy than widows, the mortality of
husbands will add new widows that are more wealthy than the original
widows. Because I do not have a utility-based model of the consump-
tion decisions of couples, I take their wealth decumulation to be 1.6
percent per year, which is the average of all couples over the ten years
of the RHS. Each time period each couple will generate three other
households: a widow, a widower, and a couple, each with a probability
that is calculated from the mortality tables. The new widows and wid-
owers have initial conditions that are related to the wealth and annuities
of the couple from which they came. The situation is shown in figure
7.3. For example, a couple in 1979 will generate four additional house-
holds by 1984, each of which will have a different wealth level because
each is identified by the sex of the survivor and the date of creation.
I make some assumptions about changes in bequeathable wealth and
annuities if the husband dies. All nominal annuities are lost. This is
roughly confirmed in the RHS data; apparently most nominal annuities
are pensions without survivors benefits (Hurd and Wise, ch. 6, in this
volume). Human capital is lost as it is almost exclusively due to the
husband's working. Social Security benefits become 0.67 of their for-
mer level, which assumes the family's benefit is based on the husband's
earnings record. Medicare/Medicaid becomes half of its former level.
I give two sets of results, each based on different assumptions about
bequeathable wealth. In the first set I assume that bequeathable wealth
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Fig. 7.3 Consumption trajectories of a couple and surviving widow
and widower210 Michael D. Hurd
figure over the ten years of the RHS (Hurd and Wise, ch. 6, in this
volume). In the second set, bequeathable wealth does not change at
the husband's death.
Table 7.2 gives medians and means of consumption, income, and
wealth of couples from 1979 through 1999. Because these results are
mostly used to generate initial conditions for the projections of the
singles, and because they are so heavily dependent on the assumptions
of the ad hoc model, I will only discuss them briefly. In the first panel,
both consumption and income include an imputed flow from Medicare/
Medicaid; in the second panel, the flow is excluded. Even for the very
oldest couples, consumption and income including Medicare/Medicaid
are substantial at both the mean and median, and the fraction in poverty
is small. Excluding Medicare/Medicaid increases somewhat the fraction
in poverty, but the general impression is that couples are reasonably
well-off.
As shown in table 7.3, the results for widows when the composition
is allowed to change due to the mortality of husbands are very different
from the projections of the 1979 RHS widows: income, wealth, and
consumption are much higher especially among older widows, and the
fractions in poverty much lower. The reasons are that in each time
period the widows who are added at the husband's death have much
higher bequeathable wealth, even after the reduction for the wealth
destruction at the husband's death, than the 1979 widows, and the new
widows have substantially higher levels of Social Security benefits,
even after reduction, than the 1979 widows.
Table 7.3, part A, shows that in the first few years consumption that
includes Medicare/Medicaid is somewhat lower than couples, but in-
come and wealth are substantially lower. This is, of course, a reflection
of the much faster consumption of capital by singles than by couples.
2
In later years, consumption by widows is only about half that of couples
at the median. The fraction of widows in poverty according to the
consumption-based measure starts at a rather low level and rises to 20
percent by 1999. By then the median age of the widows is 89, and,
even though the mortality rate of the widows is high, there are still a
sizeable number of widows because almost all of the husbands have
died. According to the income-based measure of poverty, the fraction
of widows in poverty actually falls. This is caused by the high level of
Social Security added by the new widows.
Even though the new widows have higher bequeathable wealth than
the original widows, the median wealth holdings become zero by 1993,
so that at least half of the widows will live off of Social Security and
Medicare/Medicaid.
In the standing population of widows, the fraction in poverty is 17.6
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ON214 Michael D. Hurd
the income measure. These fractions were found by taking a weighted
average of the fractions in poverty in each year.
When Medicare/Medicaid is excluded from the income and con-
sumption measures, the results change substantially; both income and
consumption drop by about $1,000 as that is roughly the per person
transfer amount imputed to the Medicare/Medicaid system. The frac-
tions in poverty rise sharply, especially at older ages; both for the
consumption-based and income-based measures, the fraction in pov-
erty in 1999 almost doubles. In the standing population, the fraction
in poverty increases to 30 percent by the consumption measure and to
about 43 percent by the income measure.
Apparently a substantial number of widows have income and con-
sumption near the poverty line, so that a fairly small change causes a
large number to fall below the poverty line. This is illustrated in table
7.4, which gives the consumption distributions in 1983. Because the
value of Medicare/Medicaid is large relative to the poverty line, many
widows are shifted into poverty by excluding Medicare/Medicaid. Both
the thickness of the distribution of widows near the poverty line and
the shifting indicate the rather artificial nature of the official classifi-
cation into poverty. In particular, if one wants to attach welfare sig-
nificance to the poverty level, more research needs to be done on the
valuation of Medicare/Medicaid.
Table 7.3, part B, has the projections based on the NL2SLS param-
eter estimates of the steady-state population of widows. As measured
by consumption, the time path of the poverty rate is changed substan-
tially. There is much more poverty at earlier ages and much less later.
As measured by income, there is less poverty overall because more
wealth is held. This points out again the weakness of an income-based
definition of poverty; the population appears to be better-off even though
they have consumed less. Although bequests at the death of the widow
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are not shown directly here, the results imply higher bequests simply
because at each age more wealth is held. That is, even among poor
widows the NL2SLS consumption paths imply that less wealth is con-
sumed and more bequeathed.
Table 7.5 gives results similar to table 7.3 except I have assumed
that no bequeathable wealth is lost at the husband's death. In that the
differences between tables 7.3 and 7.5 are about the same for each
estimation method, I will not discuss separately parts A and B. Of
course, because bequeathable wealth is not lost at the husband's death,
consumption, income, and wealth are higher. The largest changes are
at mean levels because of the skewed distribution of bequeathable
wealth. In fact, there is very little change in the poverty levels: those
close to the poverty level have very little bequeathable wealth; thus,
it matters little whether bequeathable wealth decreases by 32 percent
at the husband's death or not.
Because the projections generate a complete distribution of couples
and widows, a poverty rate over both groups is found by taking a












This shows again the importance of Medicare/Medicaid. The difference
between the consumption-based and income-based measures are not
as large, but it should be remembered that the consumption of wealth
by couples is not based on a utility model.
7.4 Conclusions
The widows in the 1979 RHS had little wealth and, according to my
projections, they quickly became even poorer. Thus, the future pros-
pects of the 1979 RHS widows are not bright. When the population of
widows was allowed to change as husbands died, the extent of poverty
was substantially less. The future prospects of the population of widows
that would be generated in steady-state by the 1979 RHS sample of
widows and couples are much better. A critical unresolved issue, how-
ever, is the measurement of poverty. I presented four measures, and
they gave substantially different fractions in poverty. Over the steady-
state population of couples and widows, the measures range from a
low of 12 percent to a high of 31 percent. The welfare consequences
are quite different at these extremes. For widows, the variation is eveno o o o
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greater. The poverty rates of widows based on the results in table 7.3,
part A, are:




Thus, the variation is from 18 percent in poverty to 43 percent de-
pending on the definition. As between the income-based and
consumption-based measures, I certainly prefer the consumption-based
measure: the income-based measure gives no weight whatsoever to the
stock of wealth that is consumed. As between the measures that include
and exclude Medicare/Medicaid, the correct choice probably is, as
usual, neither, but something in between.
Appendix
3





U(ct) = cj-y/(\ - y), and
a, = 1 - pomsds
is the probability that the individual is alive at tw mt is the instantaneous
mortality rate; p is the subjective time rate of discount; r is the real
interest rate which is taken to be known and fixed; V(.) is the utility
from bequests. This formulation of utility maximization with bequests
is from Yaari (1965). The resources available are bequeathable wealth,
wt, and annuities, including pensions, Social Security, and Medicare/
Medicaid. Annuities are distinguished from bequeathable wealth in that
they cannot be borrowed against and are not bequeathable. The con-
ditions on the utility maximization are that initial wealth; w0, is given,
and that
(2) wt = woe
rt + J'O(AS - c^-^ds > 0 for all /.
As is the flow of annuities at time s. This formulation differs from the
usual intertemporal utility-maximization problem in that the annuity
stream cannot be summarized by its expected present value. It turns219 The Poverty of Widows
out, because many of the elderly have large annuities relative to their
bequeathable wealth, that the corner solutions are important. I param-
eterize the bequest function by assuming that the marginal utility of
bequests is constant. This assumption may be defended in several ways.
First, from a practical point of view, without such an assumption the
model cannot be solved; the estimation requires a model solution.
Second, in other work I found that the strength of the bequest motive
did not seem to depend on the wealth level (Hurd 1987). Third, vari-
ations in the level of wealth cause only small variations in the level of
the wealth of the heirs; therefore, the marginal utility of wealth of the
heirs will roughly be constant over variations in wealth of the older
generation, and one would expect the marginal utility of bequests to
be constant.
The Pontryagin necessary conditions associated with this problem
are that
(3) ct = At,
if w, = 0, and that
(4) c,"









over an interval (t, t + h), in which wt > 0; a is the constant marginal
utility of bequests.
If p > r, these conditions generate consumption trajectories that slope
downward, and, unless wealth is very large, wealth trajectories that
also slope downward. A typical example is shown in figure 7.1: the
consumption path follows equation (4) until bequeathable wealth is
exhausted at T; then it follows equation (3). The present value of the
area under the consumption path and above the annunity path equals
initial bequeathable wealth. The solution is implicitly defined by:








(5.3) wT = woe
rT + f'o(As - cje^'^ds,
(5.4) wT = 0.
If initial wealth is very large, wealth will never go to zero, and the
nature of the solution is different. Although these cases are taken care
of in the estimation, I will not discuss them here because empirically
they are not important.
Data
The data are from the Longitudinal Retirement History Survey. About
11,000 households whose heads were born in 1906-11 were interviewed220 Michael D. Hurd
every two years from 1969 through 1979. Detailed questions were asked
about all assets (except a meaningful question on life insurance), and
the data were linked with official Social Security records so that one
can calculate exactly Social Security benefits. There are some data on
consumption, but they are not complete, so I estimate the parameters
of the model over wealth data. Bequeathable wealth includes stocks
and bonds, property, businesses, and savings accounts, all less debts.
As suggested by King and Dicks-Mireaux (1982), I exclude housing
wealth because the costs of adjusting housing consumption are sub-
stantial, so that people may not follow their desired housing consump-
tion path. As long as the consumption of other goods follows its desired
path, the parameters may be estimated over bequeathable wealth ex-
cluding housing wealth. Annuities include pensions, Social Security
benefits, an estimated income value from Medicare/Medicaid, privately
purchased annuities (which are very small), welfare transfers, and
transfers from relatives. See Hurd and Shoven (1985) for a detailed
description of the data.
4
The estimation method is to use equations (5) to solve for the con-
sumption path as a function of an initial choice of the parameter values.
This requires numerical integration and a search for T. The solution
will depend on initial wealth. Then, wealth in the next survey, w2, is
predicted from equation (2). That is, the necessary conditions and the
boundary conditions, equations (5), implicitly define
w2 = f(wo,{A},Q),
in which w0 is initial wealth, (A) is the annuity stream, and 0 is the
parameter vector (y e a)\ The parameter space is searched to minimize
a function of (w2 - f).
Although a is, in principle, identified through nonlinearities in the
functional form, the identification is very weak. Therefore, I specify
that a is zero if a household has no living children.
5 The interpretation
of a is the increase in the marginal utility of bequests across households
according to whether they have living children or not. The first set of
parameter estimates comes from solving
minS [w2 - f(wo,{A},W-
e
The estimated parameter values, which I refer to as the nonlinear least
squares (NLLS) estimates, are
0.729 0.0501 5.0 x 10"
7
(0.004) (0.091) (1 x 10"
4)
Number of observations = 5,452221 The Poverty of Widows
An analysis of the residuals was consistent with the hypothesis that
wealth is observed with error. Therefore, I estimated the parameters
by nonlinear two-stage least squares (NL2SLS), in which the parameter
estimates come from solving
(15) min [w2 - A«)\X{X'X)-'X'[w2 -
e
X is an n x 15 matrix of observations on income from wealth; these
data are not derived from the wealth data but come from separate
questions in the RHS. Thus, they should not be correlated with the
observation errors in w0.
The results from the NL2SLS are
1.12 -0.011 6.0 x 10"
7
(0.074) (0.002) (32 x 10'
7)
Number of observations = 5,452
The major difference between the two sets of results is in r - p,
which, if the mortality rate were zero, would control the slope of the
consumption trajectory. In the NLLS r - p is approximately -0.02;
even with a bequest motive, the consumption path will slope down-
ward. In the NL2SLS estimates r - p is about 0.04. Even without a
bequest motive, the consumption slope will have a positive slope until
the conditional mortality rate, mtlat, exceeds 0.04. The NL2SLS con-
sumption trajectories will be much flatter than the NLLS trajectories.
Both sets of estimates produce an estimate of 7 that is much smaller
that what has typically been assumed in the literature. For example,
Kotlikoff, Shoven, and Spivak (1983, 1984) use a value of 4 in their
simulations. Hubbard [1987] uses values of 0.75, 2, and 4. Davies's
(1981) "best guess" for his simulations is 4. Large values of y mean
that the slope of the consumption trajectory is not sensitive to variations
in mortality rates; my estimates imply that the consumption paths of
the elderly will have substantial variation with mortality rates.
The marginal utility of bequests, a, is estimated to be very small,
which is consistent with other estimates I have made in a model that
is almost free of functional form restrictions (Hurd 1987). The small
estimate of a is caused by the fact that in the data there is no difference
between the saving rates of households with children and households
without children.222 Michael D. Hurd
Notes
1. I include housing wealth in these simulations because the simulations
should give a good idea of the economic status of the elderly. A reasonable
supposition is that housing wealth declines over long periods at the same rate
as other bequeathable wealth. An alternative method would be to exclude
housing wealth from the simulations and to impute a consumption value to the
stock. The parameters used in the forecasts are those from the NLLS estimation.
2. Couples should decumulate wealth at a slower rate than singles because
the life expectancy of the household is greater.
3. This section is drawn from Hurd (1986).
4. The estimation is over all singles observed in any two-year period. The
real interest rate, r, is taken to be 0.03.
5. Although the RHS does not have information about the ages of the chil-
dren, because of the ages of the RHS population the median age of the children
would be about 30 in the first year of the survey. Thus, almost all the children
will have their own households.
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Comment David E. Bloom
Michael Hurd's paper is concerned with the future economic status of
elderly widows. The paper's starting point is the observation that the
incidence of poverty among elderly widows is substantial and that the
availability of appropriate panel data makes it possible to research the
dynamics of the process that led them into that state. By making certain
assumptions about (1) the future economic environment, (2) the rate
at which elderly widows are "born," (3) the magnitude of economic
resources available to elderly widows when they are "born," and (4)
the death rate of elderly widows, one can use estimates of a dynamic
model of economic well-being among elderly women to project the size
of the next generation of elderly widows as well as various aspects of
their economic situation.
Two key exercises form the core of this paper. The first involves
estimating a dynamic programming model of consumer choice by el-
derly widows using data contained in the Retirement History Survey
(RHS). Since consumption expenditures are not directly observed, they
are inferred from data on annuity income, asset income, and changes
in assets. An intertemporal utility function is posited with consumption
and bequests as its arguments. Individuals are assumed to make choices
that maximize the value of this function subject to an intertemporal
budget constraint. There are two ways in which individuals can become
poor in this model: (1) their initial level of assets and annuity income
may be too low to keep them out of poverty, or (2) they may decumulate
their assets "too quickly," perhaps because they live longer than they
expected. The empirical analysis is focused on the estimation of three
key parameters: the marginal utility of bequests, a risk-aversion pa-
rameter in a constant risk-aversion utility function, and individuals'
subjective rate of time discount. The parameters are estimated by non-
linear least squares and nonlinear two-stage least squares (to account
for possible measurement error).
The second exercise reported in this paper involves the projection
of consumption expenditures for elderly widows over the years 1979
to 1999. This projection involves the application of the parameters of
Hurd's intertemporal consumption model to wealth and income data
on (1) women who were elderly widows in 1979 and (2) women in the
1979 wave of the RHS who are at risk of becoming elderly widows by
1999. The data for both groups of women were adjusted for expected
mortality using standard demographic life tables. Necessary data on
initial economic resources (i.e., assets, asset income, and annuity
David E. Bloom is a Professor of Economics at Columbia University and a Research
Associate of the National Bureau of Economic Research.224 Michael D. Hurd
income) are directly available in the RHS for the first group of women.
For the second group, these data are estimated under the (empirically
justified) assumptions that couples decumulate their assets smoothly
at the rate of 1.6 percent per year, and that there is roughly a one-third
decline in the value of bequeathable assets at the point at which the
husband dies and an elderly widow is "born."
The main result that emerges from Hurd's research is that the future
incidence of poverty among elderly widows will be quite high. When
the value of Medicare/Medicaid is included as part of an individual's
resources, the rate of poverty is projected to lie between 16 percent
and 22 percent, depending on whether one measures poverty in terms
of income (i.e., annuity income plus asset income) or consumption
(i.e., annuity income plus asset income plus changes in wealth) and
whether one relies on the nonlinear least squares results or on the
nonlinear two-stage least squares results. If one places zero value on
Medicare/Medicaid benefits, the poverty rate projections increase to a
range of 30 percent to 42 percent.
As the above summary should make clear, the ideas in Dr. Hurd's
paper are fairly straightforward. In discussing it, I would like to focus
on two issues: first, whether the paper addresses an interesting ques-
tion, and second, the extent to which the paper answers the main
question it sets for itself.
As noted above, the principal goal of this paper is to forecast the
economic status of elderly widows, with special emphasis on the in-
cidence of poverty among this group. Insofar as elderly widows are an
easily identifiable group of individuals with an above-average rate of
poverty (i.e., 19 percent according to the March 1986 Current Popu-
lation Survey, as compared to about 14 percent in the overall popu-
lation), it is hard to argue that this is not an interesting topic for research.
Nonetheless, it is not clear that widows are either the most natural or
the most interesting group of elderly women on which to focus such
an analysis. The term widow is used to refer to women whose husbands
died while they were still married. Although widows represent 85 per-
cent of all elderly women who are not currently married (see table 7.6),
it is not immediately apparent why they should be treated separately
from never-married women and from women who divorced their last
husband and never remarried. Both of these groups of women had even
higher rates of poverty than elderly widows in 1986: 22 percent for
elderly never-married women and 28 percent for elderly divorced or
separated women. More importantly, because of the secular decline in
the marriage rate and the increase in the divorce rate, the number of
elderly women in these latter groups will probably grow at much faster
rates over the remainder of this century than the number of elderly
























































Source: Tabulations from the March 1986 Current Population Survey.
teresting question, I think it overlooks an even more interesting ques-
tion that was well within its grasp. In other words, I would have preferred
to comment on a paper entitled: "The Poverty of Elderly Unmarried
Women: Future Prospects." It may sound a bit less sexy, but I think
it would be somewhat more meaningful.
In terms of the question that Dr. Hurd does try to answer, I have
some concerns about the appropriateness of his theoretical model. In
particular, the model does not account for the two major responses
that elderly women can make to evade poverty: (1) they can go to
work, or (2) they can situate themselves within economically well-off
households.
The labor supply of elderly widows has never been a major focus of
empirical labor economics, undoubtedly because it is so low. Data
contained in the March 1986 Current Population Survey indicate that
the labor force participation rate of elderly widows is 6.0 percent, with
a rate of 7.6 percent among elderly widows living alone and a rate of
just 2.5 percent among elderly widows living with others (see table
7.7). In addition, 8.1 percent of the widows had positive earnings in
1985 and they earned an average of nearly $6,700. These labor force
participation rates and average earnings levels are anything but large
in magnitude, but they do make it clear that the imputation of con-
sumption expenditure as the sum of annuity income plus asset income
plus the change in assets introduces systematic error into Hurd's model.226 Michael D. Hurd
Table 7.7 Selected Characteristics of Husbandless Women Aged 65 and Over,
by Marital Status and Living Arrangements
Divorced or
Widowed Separated Never Married
Living with Living with Living with
relatives relatives relatives
























Source: Tabulations from the March 1986 Current Population Survey.
The error introduced by the omission of reported earnings from the
imputed value of consumption is likely to be further aggravated to the
extent that the elderly are not reporting income earned as a result of
labor supplied to the underground economy. Although it is obviously
a complex problem requiring data that may be extremely difficult to
generate, future research on the consumption of elderly individuals
should not assume their labor supply to be exogenously fixed at zero.
The second problem with the theoretical model set out by Hurd is
that it pays scant attention to the living arrangements of elderly widows.
According to the March 1986 Current Population Survey, 30.7 percent
of (noninstitutionalized) elderly widows live with relatives. The im-
portance of living arrangements to the economic well-being of elderly
widows is strongly suggested by the poverty rates reported in table
7.7. The poverty rate among elderly widows living with relatives is
roughly one-fourth the poverty rate among elderly widows that do not
live with relatives. For elderly women who are divorced, separated,
or never married, poverty rates are also substantially lower for those
living with relatives than for those not living with relatives. These data
highlight the importance of accounting for living arrangements insofar
as they may be correlated with intrahousehold transfers that can sub-
stantially affect individual well-being. Although somewhat less pro-
nounced, comparisons for women in particular age groups exhibit similar
relationships.
Another dimension of the relationship between living arrangements
and economic well-being is illustrated by the fact that the dollar increase
in the poverty line is only 26 percent when a household changes com-
position from one individual aged 65 and over to two such individuals.
This less-than-proportional increase reflects economies of scale in the227 The Poverty of Widows
provision of household goods and further establishes the fact that "liv-
ing arrangements" is likely to be a critical choice variable in whatever
constrained utility-maximization process elderly widows go through.
Ignoring the determinants and consequences of different living arrange-
ments among elderly widows is potentially a gross oversight in Hurd's
analysis.
Although it is disturbingly unclear in Hurd's paper, the future well-
being of those women who are elderly widows in 1979 is not calculated
in a way that accounts for their actual living arrangements in 1979. The
RHS simply does not contain information on the income of all family/
household members in which an elderly widow might reside. For this
reason, the RHS is fundamentally inappropriate as a source of data for
studying the economic well-being of the elderly, a point that seems to
be frequently overlooked in the empirical literature on this subject.
It also appears that elderly widows who are "born" after 1979 are
assumed by Hurd to live the remainder of their lives in single-person
households. If this is so, the figures reported in table 7.7 clearly suggest
that Hurd's poverty rate projections will be upward biased estimates
of the true rates, since many elderly widows will undoubtedly become
members of multi-person households in order to economize on their
scarce resources.
One is not actually able to tell from the paper whether the parameters
of the structural consumption model are estimated from a restricted
sample that only includes elderly widows who are living alone or an
unrestricted sample that includes all elderly widows but treats them as
if they are living alone. If the sample is restricted to lone elderly wid-
ows, we clearly have a case in which sample selectivity is likely to be
severe. We also have a set of projections that do not generalize to the
entire population of elderly widows. In addition, biases introduced by
having ignored the widows' labor supply are probably aggravated in
such a sample, since the labor force participation rate of elderly widows
living alone is more than three times that of elderly widows who do
not live alone. On the other hand, if all elderly widows are treated as
if they live alone, the poverty rate projections in Hurd's paper are
likely to be biased upward, as explained above, perhaps by as much
as 6 or 7 percentage points.
In addition to problems relating to the theoretical basis of Hurd's
model, I feel quite apprehensive about several features of the empirical
analysis. The paper offers no basis for careful assessment of the em-
pirical results. Simple descriptive statistics are not even reported. In
addition, although the overriding purpose of Hurd's analysis is predic-
tion, the paper reports no evidence relating to the goodness-of-fit of
the model to the data. The empirical model also ignores available data
on a wide range of potentially useful control variables such as race,228 Michael D. Hurd
birth cohort, educational attainment, and geographic region. I am dis-
concerted by Hurd's inattention to variables that would almost cer-
tainly improve the predictive power of his predictive model substantially.
It would also have been nice to see some details in the paper on the
method used to impute the value of Medicare/Medicaid.
Doubts should also be expressed about the robustness and the plau-
sibility of the parameter estimates. Estimates of the subjective rate of
time discount vary between specifications from -0.01 to 0.05, which
translates into large differences in the (negative) slope of the intertem-
poral consumption profile. On the other hand, estimates of the risk-
aversion parameter in the utility function vary less—between 0.73 and
1.12—but they are both in a range that implies much greater sensitivity
of consumption to variations in mortality risk than would be considered
sensible based on other literature in this general area. Finally, the
marginal utility of bequests—assumed to be constant in wealth—is
estimated to be close to zero. Although close in magnitude to estimates
reported in previous work by Hurd, this parameter is identified largely
off the functional form of the empirical model and by a somewhat
arbitrary restriction. More analysis is required if we are to believe the
parameter estimates presented in Hurd's paper.
My final comment simply involves stressing the fact that Dr. Hurd's
paper focuses on only a small piece of the problem of forecasting the
economic well-being of elderly widows—analyzing the evolution of
their consumption over the last part of their life cycle. If one were
truly interested in accurately projecting the future rate of poverty among
elderly widows, a number of other factors would also deserve serious
consideration. Included on a list of such factors would be increasing
longevity, the emergence of alternative living arrangements among the
elderly, the effect of changing generation sizes and a widening gener-
ation gap, increased geographic mobility among individuals of all ages,
and increasing educational attainment, labor force participation, and
"careerism" among women. The role of nursing homes and other res-
idential institutions for the elderly deserves special research attention.
One factor that is likely to be of considerable importance to the
future economic well-being of the elderly is the increasing tightness in
the U.S. labor market. Over the past three decades, the American labor
force has grown at an average annual rate of 2 percent, largely a con-
sequence of the "baby boom" entering the labor market and of rapid
growth in female labor force participation rates. During the remaining
years of this century, the labor force will grow at perhaps 1.0 to 1.1
percent per year. Higher real wages are the most likely result of tighter
labor markets, although I think we can also expect to see the expansion
of employment opportunities that cater more closely to the needs and229 The Poverty of Widows
preferences of segments of the population that could potentially supply
more labor, such as the elderly. For example, some employers in the
service-producing industries have already begun to formulate and im-
plement recruitment strategies that focus on elderly workers. As an-
other example, the child-care industry is almost certain to undergo
major growth in the next 10 to 15 years, and it is absolutely clear that
many elderly widows have superb backgrounds and training for taking
up jobs in that industry. Increases in hours worked by elderly widows,
as well as in their earnings per hour, should certainly be accounted for
in analyses of their future economic prospects.
Another factor that should be considered in assessing the future
economic prospects of the elderly relates to their future political clout.
There is little doubt that the United States will be a considerably nicer
place for elderly persons to be at the turn of the century than it is
today. Political favoritism of the elderly has already begun and will
gain further momentum as the elderly become an increasingly powerful
political constituency.
The bottom line of Dr. Hurd's paper is that elderly widows have a
rather dim economic future. He reaches that conclusion by analyzing
a narrow piece of the overall problem, using imperfect data to estimate
a rather structured and restrictive economic model. Dr. Hurd's analysis
notwithstanding, I am more optimistic about the future economic pros-
pects of elderly widows on the basis of casual speculation about rel-
evant social, economic, and political adjustments that have already
begun and that will almost certainly continue to occur during the re-
mainder of this century.